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The changing characteristics of the international financial systems starting from the second half 
of 2007 came as no surprise.  Looking at the events in a synthetic manner, the main factors that 
led to the triggering and amplification of the crisis can be identified in the dramatic increase of 
new  and  more  complex  financial  instruments,  with  increasing  lack  of  transparency,  in  the 
conflicts  of  interest  between  market  participants,  in  the  imprudent  lending  practices  in  the 
financial services industry, in the deficiencies of rating agencies, together with the excessive 
confidence in the market’s self regulation, the unrealistically low risk attributable to certain 
investments and, the inability to respond to early warning signals or to learn from the lessons of 
the previous crises.  
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Subprime loans, as a triggering factor of the crisis 
While  not  all  mortgage  loans  may  be  automatically  placed  in  the  category  of  subprime 
mortgages,  one  can  observe  the  proliferation  of  this  kind  of  loans  in  the  21st  century.  
Approximately 21% of the total mortgage loans, between 2004 and 2006, fell into the subprime 
category, as compared to the 9% level in 1996 (Golsbee, 2007).  In the third quarter of 2007, 
subprime  mortgage  loans  with  variable  interest  rate,  represented  only  6.8%  of  the  mortgage 
loans, but accounted for 43% of the loans for which the right for mortgage repurchase because of 
unpaid obligations had stopped.  The subprime mortgages with fixed interest rate accounted for 
6.3%  of  the  total  mortgages  and  only  for  12%  of  those  with  cancelled  right  of  mortgage 
repurchasing.  
Objectively speaking, as long as the risks involved with such loans is closely  monitored by 
creditors, imposing higher interest rates and guarantees, one can say that  there was  no  imminent 
danger related to such loans.  But, as in many previous crises, the relaxation of lending standards 
was one of triggers of the initial losses.  Often, it was allowed for borrowers to enter into the 
possession of large sums of money that would later increase the borrowers’ expenses, once the 
period of low interest rates expired and once the repaying of rates of capital had started (Dodd & 
Mills, 2008).  
The reasoning that lied at the basis of such loans was found in the increasing prices of real 
estate.  Thus  it  is  considered  that  potential  repayment  problems  could  be  reduced  and  even 
eliminated by the market value of the presented guarantees. If borrowers failed to repay maturing 
rates on time, the high value housing could facilitate refinancing the loan.  
 
Specific developments due to the process of financial innovation  
Concretely, the disruptions relate to the developments in the U.S. mortgage market and, for a 
better understanding of the transformations suffered, one should make a brief foray into history.   743 
Thus, after the 30’s crisis, based on the "New Deal" program of the Roosevelt administration, a 
public body-the Federal National Mortgage Association was created, whose objective was to 
increase the volume of loans and mortgages, thus stimulating the economy by all the positive 
effects that the development of the construction sector may have on it. Fannie Mae took over 
from the initial lenders the default and liquidity risk, which it could manage much better than the 
first line distributors credits, as it had a portfolio of mortgages much more diverse and more 
widespread at the national level than the usual banking institutions. This body could borrow 
funds itself on longer term than banks, which was likely to reduce the liquidity risk. In 1970, the 
Government National Mortgage Association another governmental institution, began issuing 
bonds  collateralized  by  mortgage  debt,  which  enabled  the  transfer  of  risk  of  default  to  the 
subscribers of such titles and relieve the federal budget of a substantial part of the debt incurred 
for financing of public programs for the construction of housingThese titles are placed on the 
capital markets, and their redemption at maturity is done directly from the owners. Also, in 1970, 
a new body was established, the Federal National Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), to issue 
securities based on classical  mortgage loans, but also to create a competitor to Fannie Mae, 
which was to be privatized.  
In time, these institutions were able to mobilize significant capital for mortgage refinancing, their 
main  operations  aiming  at  acquiring  and  holding  assets  in  prime  mortgages,  as  well  as  the 
transformation of mortgage loans in a variety of debt securities collateralized by mortgages. This 
operation  is  called  securitization,  generally,  a  technique  that transforms  less liquid  financial 
assets into negotiable securities such as bonds.  
Mortgage securities that are based on mortgage loans from one lender, are usually issued through 
swap transactions in which the lender changes the package of mortgages for MBS. Mortgage 
securities backed by multiple creditors allow some creditors to pack mortgages in exchange for 
the receipt of mortgage securities representing a proportionate part of a larger package (Cerna, 
2008).  Generally, mortgage securities tend to provide coupon rates higher than the treasury 
securities issued by the U.S. Government. In part, this is because the interest rates charged for 
mortgages are higher than the interest rates offered by the U.S. government. At the same time, 
however, the higher interest rates of the mortgage securities also reflect the level of investment 
risk  raised  by  the  uncertainty  due  to  the  advance  repayments.  In  the  U.S.,  these  mortgage 
securities  are  guaranteed  by  the  GNMA,  FNMC  and  FNMA.  The  mortgage  pass-through 
securities issued and/or guaranteed by the organizations listed above are the most numerous and, 
are characterized by an AAA credit rating.  
 
This structure of the market, based on organizations supported by the state, proved to be very 
profitable, and therefore attracted other financial institutions as well. Thus, if in 2003 the semi-
completed 76% of the total issuance of debt securities backed by mortgages and other assets of 
the issuer, the remaining 24% representing the large financial corporations on Wall Street, in 
mid-2006,  the share of the  semi-public  bodies decreased  to  43%,  while the share  of  private 
securities increased to 57% of the total.  The major private issuers of this type of securities were 
the well known U.S. investment banks (Wells Fargo, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, JP Morgan, 
Goldman Sachs, and Bank of America).  
 
Parallel with this rapid and radical transformation of the market, there was a change in lending 
standards in the U.S. following the deregulation process.  In this liberal framework, while Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac have continued to provide almost exclusively prime loans, the private 
corporations have increased their market share, mainly through the securitization of mortgages 
with high risk and of the so called "Alt-A loans" granted to solvent, but less reliable  debtors than 
the first class customers. However, this increase in the quantity of securities backed by doubtful 
mortgages created a problem, because the main purchasers of such securities were institutional 
investors with a limited exposure to the holding of such securities.  Consequently, only a small  
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proportion of claims with high risk could be sold to institutional investors in search of higher 
To  address  this  issue  there  was  adopted  a  strategy  of  dividing  risks  in  more  categories  or 
"tranches" with separate administration, thus determining a widening of the market for mortgage 
debts with high risk. From a technical point of view, this operation consists in dividing the 
s: one characterized by a low risk level and, one with high risk 
To this end, firms on Wall Street have opted for a new financial instrument, created in 
1987  by  the  financial  investment  firm,  Drexel  Burnham  Lambert,  called  collateralized  debt 
An  essential  difference  between  CDOs  and  other  mortgage  derivatives  on  one  hand,  and 
securities listed at stock exchanges and futures contracts on the other hand, is that the former are 
ut on over-the – counter markets (OTC).  On these markets 
transactions  are  carried  out  directly  between  customers  and  dealers,  unlike  the  stock  market 
where sale or purchase orders are intermediated, as for the data about the volume of transactions 
hese are not published officially.  The price formation method has no transparency. 
It should also be noted that there does not exist a supervisory authority for OTC markets, that 
allows the identification of large or vulnerable exposures, nor do lenders of last resort exist, in 
order to provide the liquidity needed in special situations.  
 
Issuance of structured credit instruments in the U.S.A and Europe 
Figure no. 1 
herefore, the degree of risk involved by such securities has been ignored by investors who 
Until  the  spring  of  2007,  some  top  managers  of  financial 
companies have begun to concern about debt securities secured by subprime mortgages. But, 
the high liquidity, the demand for structured credit products 
with AAA ratings and higher than normal yields, has continued to increase until mid-2007, as it 
The development and generalized impact of the subprime mortgage crisis  
The demand for real estate in the U.S. has increased considerably in the recent years, which led to 
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Price evolution together with the exponential growth of prices after 2000 put the U.S. housing 
prices in a speculative bubble, the increase being determined by expectations regarding future 
price increases, rather than by economic foundations.  The explanation lies in the fact that the 
homes were purchased for their future anticipated price level, price that could offset the initial 
yield offered. On the other hand, this increase was driven by the increased volume of mortgages 
granted, by the eased access to these credits and also by the development of the construction 
sector in the period of economic prosperity.  
 
In 2005-2006 interest rates began to rise and housing prices to decline moderately in many U.S. 
regions.  As a result, outstanding loans rose as the initial terms have expired and variable interest 
rates rose.  The inability of borrowers to honor the installments of maturing mortgages resulted in 
the mass start of the sale of properties by property holders and credit institutions.  The market 
was flooded of houses from liquidation of mortgages, while new houses were not sold so well 
either, which led to a further decrease in the value of homes. Selling these houses below their 
market value (and obviously the price of acquisition or accepted value of collateral) has increased 
the  default  rate of loans and  the  incapacity  to recover  the total claims  by  credit  institutions 
(Bordo, 2007).  
 
The mortgage market crisis actually began when investors with very large debts, such as hedge 
funds have tried to adjust their exposure or, to exit the losing positions, which made the high risk 
mortgage backed securities’ market to become illiquid. In this way, in August 2007, hedge funds 
were seen stuck on unfavorable positions, and this just when they had to pay the premiums 
required by their brokers. The situation has worsened even further, because with the termination 
of transactions, there were no market prices any more, to serve as benchmarks, or other means to 
determine the value of the securities contained in various tranches of risk (Corbu, 2008).  The 
consequence of the shown disruptions was that hedge funds stopped their transactions, while the 
CDO market and the credit related derivatives have virtually ceased to exist.   
 
Regarding the banks financing the initial lenders, they have ceased their support, which made the 
latter unable to meet payment obligations related to the stock of mortgage loans granted  Finally, 
potential buyers and home owners could not get mortgages any more, which has put them in the 
situation of not being able to pay for construction work performed.  In turn, constructors, which 
have previously got loans to build homes for sale, could not sell their homes and therefore could 
not repay loans, etc.  
 
All these phenomena have resulted in a strong contraction of demand in the construction of 
housing, with all the series of negative implications for the economic growth.  The fact that hedge 
funds and other investors did not buy high risk mortgage debt any more has shown that all these 
claims were no longer considered secure forms of investment. Accordingly, securities prices have 
dropped and their issuers have not been able to procure the necessary funds for the repayment of 
mortgages  and  other  types  of  loans  they  have  contracted  from  big  banks  and  financial 
corporations.  In this way, when the credit resources were exhausted, in the financial system 
appeared a new request for additional loans.  
 
Taking into account the consequences of these developments, beyond the losses of the U.S. 
economy, spectacular bankruptcies, causing millions of unemployed and affecting all sectors, 
another  more  serious  problem  appears,  namely  the  repercussions  of  the  U.S.  crisis  on 
international  financial  markets  and  world  economies.    The  propagation  of  the  crisis  effects 
appears as an unquestioned reality, through a simple fact that, currently, we can no longer speak 
of an isolated financial crisis in the U.S., but rather of a global financial crisis, which through the 
implications on the real economy, has become a generalized economic crisis.     746
 
The role of Rating Agencies in crisis triggering   
 
The rating agencies have played an important role in the triggering of the crisis.  A feature of this 
sector is the lack of a consistent standard for assessing the ratings for structured securities.  Lack 
of such a standard of evaluation may lead to arbitrary decisions.  The lack of single standards of 
evaluation, the lack of legislation to penalize the assessment practices that allow changing the 
rating from one day to another, the lack of competition, the conflict of interest that appears at the 
financing of a ratings evaluation project, are sufficient grounds to trigger a crisis of loan markets.  
 
Rating agencies were in no position to rate securitized transactions (CDO and MBS), backed by 
subprime  mortgages.    The  high  ratings  given  to  these  securities  were  justified  by  various 
improvements in the lending sector, by the greater value of the collateral than of the loan itself, as 
well as by the existence of the investors in securities willing to take over the risk of losses.  On 
the other hand, rating agencies have asserted that they only took into account the risk of default, 
and not liquidity risk or market risk, which investors often tend to neglect.  Some critics of these 
agencies say that conflicts of interest also appeared in this process, because rating agencies are 
paid  by  companies  that  organizes  and  place  such  instruments  to  investors,  companies  like 
investment banks (Crainic, 2007).  
 
Another criticism brought to rating agencies, is that these agencies have always been late in 
discovering the signals of a crisis.  The situation is similar to that of Enron, when rating agencies 
have  been  unable  to  notify  the  company’s  tremendous  exposure.    Agencies'  inability  to 
distinguish signals of the subprime crisis has determined both the U.S. and the EU authorities to 
improve the regulatory and monitoring framework of their activities and, not least to make them 




The financial crisis can be viewed, in a very broad way, as a state of imbalance, over certain 
limits, among different parts of the market.  Some financial crisis may be predictable, while 
others  are  difficult  to  predict.  The  ongoing  financial  crisis,  which  has  developed  since  the 
summer of 2007, according to many experts, was expected. The problem that developed was not 
whether it will actually happen, but when it would begin. The factor that triggered this crisis is 
represented by the U.S. subprime market.  
 
During the pre-crisis period, low interest rates, high liquidity, low volatility of financial markets 
and a general feeling of satisfaction, have encouraged many categories of investors to assume 
much higher risks.  The changing characteristics of the international financial systems starting 
from  the  second  half  of  2007  came  as  no  surprise.    Many  supranational  institutions  (The 
International  Monetary  Fund,  The  Bank  for  International  Settlements,  The  European  Central 
Bank) have pointed out that risk is undervalued and that a reverse evolution is progressively more 
possible.  
 
Looking at the events in a synthetic manner, the main factors that led to the triggering and 
amplification  of  crisis  can  be  identified  in  the  dramatic  increase  of  new  and  more  complex 
financial instruments, with increasing lack of transparency, in the conflicts of interest between 
market participants, in the imprudent lending practices in the financial services industry, in the 
deficiencies  of  rating  agencies,  together  with  the  excessive  confidence  in  the  market’s  self 
regulation, the unrealistically low risk attributable to certain investments and, the inability to 
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